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In this paper we wish to look at the relationship between basic education and politics in the 
Republic and Laws of Plato with particular reference to the role and status of women in each account. 
We shall be passing over the highly specialized higher education given to prospective male and female 
Guardians described in book seven of the Republic, and concentrating on primary education. In the 
Republic this, too, as it happens, is also described in terms of the role it plays in the upbringing of 
prospective male and female Guardians; it is left to the reader to infer how much of this is supposed 
to apply to the general population. But before we get to that, it would probably be useful just to give a 
brief summary of the highlights of the primary education in question.
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жеНщИНы, обРазоваНИе И ПоЛИтИка У ПЛатоНа
Статья рассматривает связи между образованием и политическими правами (и обязан-
ностями), которые четко проговорены в  платоновских диалогах «Государство» и «Законы». 
В  Каллиполисе, проект которого создается Платоном в «Государстве», важнейшей цементи-
рующей силой общества является сословие стражей. Показательно, что женщины в сословии 
стражей играют важную роль и получают воспитание, близкое к мужскому. В «Законах» жен-
щины также получают практически полный спектр воспитания, в  том числе военного. По-
добный взгляд Платона резко контрастирует с представлениями о женской природе, которые 
были распространены в Античности. Платон полагал, что женское начало возникает из «сверх-
души», которая имеет мужскую природу («Тимей»), между женским и мужским нет абсолют-
ного разрыва. В «Политике» Платон показывает, как феминное и маскулинное начала могут 
проявляться в социальных добродетелях граждан («уравновешенных» и «мужественных»).
Вместе с тем в «Законах» Платон отказывает женщинам в реальных политических правах. 
Причиной этого являются земные реалии: поскольку реальное государство (условная «Маг-
незия») составлено не из божественных людей и детей богов, именно в женщине проявляет-
ся низшее, материальное, начало, которое делает, по мнению Платона, вручение ей рычагов 
управления обществом слишком рискованным предприятием.
Т. Робинсон является автором тех разделов статьи, где поднимаются проблемы образова-
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In this paper we wish to look at the relationship between basic education and poli-
tics in the Republic and Laws of Plato with particular reference to the role and status of 
women in each account. We shall be passing over the highly specialized higher education 
given to prospective male and female Guardians described in book seven of the Republic, 
and concentrating on primary education. In the Republic this, too, as it happens, is also 
described in terms of the role it plays in the upbringing of prospective male and female 
Guardians; it is left to the reader to infer how much of this is supposed to apply to the gen-
eral population. But before we get to that, it would probably be useful just to give a brief 
summary of the highlights of the primary education in question.
To produce the future rulers of his just society, says Socrates (376d ff.), a number of 
specific conditions must be fulfilled. The first is a sound educational system for soul and 
body, but particularly soul. This will involve the establishment of an educational envi-
ronment based on the so-called “mimetic» theory of education, according to which we 
become what we become as persons through a process of osmosis from a particular educa-
tional environment. For the Greeks, most of them non-literate, educational environment 
meant in effect the artistic environment of dramatic festivals, rhapsodic recitations and 
the like, along with the physical presence at all times of their cities’ civic structures, statues 
and temples, all in a context of the overwhelming natural beauty of the country in which 
they lived.
The appropriate artistic environment for the future rulers his good society, says 
Socrates, will, as far as drama, literature, music and the visual arts are concerned, involve 
truth in content and beauty in form, on the grounds that our objective is to produce rulers 
characterized by both beauty of soul and maximal rationality and knowledge. And how, 
he wonders aloud, can this be achieved if they are surrounded by ugliness in the visual 
and aural arts and are permanently deceived on vital matters by much that is conveyed 
in drama and other forms of literature? The result is a set of suggestions which we know 
astonished the Republic’s first readers, and have drawn comment ever since.
Much of Homer, for example, to this date the nearest the Greeks had to a sacred 
book, will in the Ideal Society (‘Kallipolis’, the ‘Beautiful City’) be drastically curtailed, on 
several grounds. First, the two poems tell untruths about the gods, who, says Socrates, are 
good and only good, cannot deceive, and are in no way anthropomorphic. The poems also 
portray a world characterized by violence, brutality, and a number of activities that do not 
fit into Socrates’ canon of virtuous action: heroes, for example, occasionally break down 
in tears. Much of Greek tragedy and comedy will suffer the same fate as Homer, and on 
similar grounds. As far as music is concerned, too much of it is too soft in its rhythms for 
Socrates, too likely to produce emotions too effeminate and un-warrior-like to be suitable 
for his citizens; this also must be ruthlessly excised from the canon. The list of villainous 
features of contemporary art-forms goes on and on, and by the end (which takes a long 
time coming; few details are spared) one is left wondering how much of the Greek artistic 
environment will in fact remain, apart from one or two fables by Aesop, a few heroic odes 
by Pindar perhaps, and a lot of military marches.
This early education, in conjunction with two years of military training, an intense 
higher education in mathematics (ten years), dialectic (five years), and fifteen years of 
hands-on political training, will form the appropriate training for rule as Guardians of 
Kallipolis by a small group of males and females chosen from an appropriate genetic back-
ground of civic virtue, intelligence, and talent for rule. 
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What of the rest of the population of Kallipolis? From Plato’s silence we can only as-
sume that they will receive as much education as most people did in societies he knew, but 
this time subject to the pre-censorship of the arts that prevails in the early education of 
future Guardians. Which means, in effect, that the great majority would receive no formal 
education at all in terms that we ourselves would understand, but would live out their lives 
illiterate and innumerate, whatever learning they received coming from parental example 
at home and societal experience outside of it, along with the osmosis-effect of a magnifi-
cent sculptural and natural environment, and the morally uplifting effect of an artistic en-
vironment, as Plato saw it, of drama, music, dance, and poetry which would stress virtue 
as life’s only acceptable end.
A small minority, born into families with wealth and reasonably enlightened val-
ues, but not deemed to be of genetically ‘Guardian’ material, would receive more formal 
instruction (in mathematics, music, dance, and the like) from paedagogoi employed for 
the purpose by their parents, but this instruction too would now be subject to the moral 
constraints laid down for all education in Kallipolis. Or so one must assume; it seems 
inconceivable that they would be allowed to attend plays, for example, which Plato deems 
morally unacceptable viewing for his future Guardians.
And, with a few exceptions, none even of this group could expect ever to join the 
Guardian class, and hence to have a share in the running of Kallipolis. (we say ‘with a few 
exceptions’, because Socrates is careful to say that there will always be enough flexibility in 
the system for promotion to, and demotion from the Guardian class, if talent [or lack of 
talent] at any level in the system on occasion manifests itself).
When we turn to Plato’s second-best society (his own term for Magnesia, the city he 
describes in the Laws), it is to a world of practical possibilities, as he sees it, rather than 
to the world of Kallipolis, which he now looks back on as something which could only be 
populated by ‘gods and sons of gods’, not normal humans, were it ever to come into be-
ing. And the adjustments he feels he needs to make are startling, not least in the realm of 
education.
In his new society, he says (we take it the ‘Athenian’ of the dialogue speaks for Plato), 
all will receive an education, males and females alike, and it will be the same education, 
including all the training in things like horsemanship and the use of weapons (including 
practicing fighting in armor, 813e) which had once been confined to boys. There will be 
six public schools for the purpose, three inside the city’s confines and three outside, and 
they will have — another revolutionary notion — paid teachers (and paid by the state, no 
less), who will “offer a complete course of instruction in the arts of war and the fine arts 
alike” (804d).
It is hard to imagine how astonishing these ideas must have been to Plato’s first read-
ers, not least because the education will be for all, politically as well as socially. There is 
no mention of any ‘special’ education for children deemed appropriate material for the 
production of Guardians of the Laws (male and female), as in the Republic; and we are left 
to infer that those who finish up Guardians of the Laws will now do so, not on grounds of 
eugenic background and a special education dedicated simply to them, but on grounds of 
demonstrated merit and talent, after having passed through exactly the same compulsory 
educational system as everyone else.
This is heady material, which may well raise us aloft for a while, but our feet soon 
touch ground again once we see that it is based, not on any supposed equality of men and 
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women, but on a state’s need for the maximal use of the material at its disposal. In Plato’s 
own words: “I say the present practice in our own part of the world is the merest folly: it 
is pure folly that men and women do not unite to follow the same pursuits with all their 
energies. In fact, almost every one of our cities on our present system is, and finds itself to 
be, the half of what it might be at the same cost in expenditure and trouble” (805a). (Sev-
eral have inferred from a later sentence in the dialogue (785b) that Plato gave citizenship 
to females in the Laws, and along with it access to all the higher civic posts that males had, 
but this seems to me very doubtful. To this degree his society finishes up using its women 
a good deal less efficiently than might have been expected from the heavy stress on equal-
ity of education).
It is a pragmatic voice we are hearing. If Plato has the ‘virtue’ of the state before his 
mind as he speaks, it is now very much the virtue that is efficiency (the basic meaning of 
the word usually translated as ‘virtue’, arete). And efficiency underlies the basic content of 
the educational practices of his new society, many of which will be familiar to readers of 
the Republic. First of all, education will be, not just the same for all, but unchanging in 
its content. So “the same children,” he says, “will always play the same games in one and 
the same way, and get their pleasure from the same playthings” (797b), on the principle 
that “change — except when it is change from what is bad — is always…highly perilous” 
(797d). The canons of music and dance will also be fixed, as each of us lives out as his life as 
one “who has been fashioned as a toy (paignion) of God” (ibid.). War is not the most seri-
ous thing in life, says Plato, as Spartans and Cretans seem to think. Play is the most serious 
thing, and that play is comprised of our conducting of sacrifices and singing of songs and 
dancing of dances all of which follow an eternally unchanging script, with the objective of 
winning heaven’s favour and vanquishing the enemy within (803c–804b).
Plato is in full flight again. But he is aware of it, and he finishes up by saying that, 
while humans are ‘puppets in the main’, they do have ‘some touch of reality about them 
too” (804b). But the concession does not satisfy the Cretan Megillus, who accuses him or 
having a “poor estimate” of humanity (ibid.). All Plato has by way of reply is that he had 
had God before his mind as he was speaking, and that he had ‘felt’ the things he had just 
said (ibid.). Whether Megillus was satisfied with this answer is not indicated.
Plato’s answer to another question is undoubtedly intriguing. As part of a discussion 
of the rote-learning of appropriate poetry which will form part of young people’s educa-
tion, the Spartan Clinias asks the Athenian how we would “advise our Guardian of the 
Law … on the choice of a standard (paradeigma) by reference to which he will permit 
the young folk to learn one piece and forbid their learning another” (811b). Plato has no 
hesitation in replying that their present discourse has been “just like a kind of poem”! 
(811c). “The fact is”, he says, “that of all the many compositions I have met with or listened 
to, in verse or in plain prose, I find it the most satisfactory and the most suitable for the 
ears of the young. So I really think I could not direct our Guardian of the Law or Minister 
of Education to a better standard, or bid him do better than instruct his schoolmasters to 
teach it to their pupils” (811d) — along with any “connected or similar matter” a teacher 
might find among poets and prose writers, or in unwritten discourses like the present one, 
which, he says, they should “get put into writing” (811e).
A question many people must have asked him — “What do you hope will be the place 
of your own writings in a city such as Magnesia were it ever to come into existence?” — 
Plato has now finally answered, at least partially. His dialogue the Laws, he says, will be the 
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standard for all prose and poetry which the young in his good society will, as part of their 
education in virtue, have to learn by rote. In the midst of so many other features of the 
educational system in the Laws which simply repeat what was said in the Republic, here 
is an item which is dramatically new, and strikingly personal. It also contains — in one of 
those en passant phrases which have the ring of truth to them — a statement that offers 
us a hint why he is so happy to call his laws a ‘paradigm’ or standard: the conversation, he 
says, which they have been engaged in since daybreak “seems to me at any rate <to have 
been> not without divine inspiration (epipnoia) of some sort” (811c). His own book, in a 
word, is a great prose-poem, and, like all great poetry, is, as Greeks believed, infused with 
the breath of God. Unlike that ‘paradigm in the heavens’, however, which is the perfect so-
ciety described in the Republic, and likely to remain forever un-instantiated, his dialogue 
the Laws will be the paradigm of all instruction — and that means instruction in what he 
has in ringing tones just characterized as the only goal of a society with any claim to be 
called ‘just’, that is, “true excellence in the virtues of soul proper to human character” — 
in a society which, second-best as an instantiation though it might be to a putative first 
instantiation of the paradigm, one where a number of the citizens are ‘in a way gods and 
sons of gods’, has a real chance of actually seeing the light of day. 
Still on the topic of citizen virtue, we notice how firmly committed Plato continues to 
be to the ideals of the Republic. On the age-old principle of like associating with like and 
like influencing like, he says that, in the matter of drama, comedy will “receive no serious 
consideration whatsoever” (316e), and tragedy will be tolerated to the degree that what 
it offers is, as he puts it, “fit to be uttered, and edifying to be heard by the public” (817d). 
Poetry and music likewise will be strictly controlled. “No poet shall compose any-
thing in contravention of the public standards of law and right, honor and good, nor shall 
he be at liberty to display any composition to any private citizen whatever until he has first 
submitted it to the appointed censors of such things and the Guardians of the Laws, and 
obtained their approval” (801d). Such poets must also have reached the age of fifty, and 
have performed at least one “noble and illustrious deed” in their lives (829c8–d1). In the 
final analysis, admits Plato disarmingly, the compositions of poets who are men of moral 
worth should be performed “even if they have no artistic content” (829d)! It is a passing 
remark, but one rich in significance: as far as education’s unique goal of the production 
and reinforcement of virtue is concerned, the high moral stature of a poet outweighs the 
low artistic value of his creations.
Education, he continues, will also have a strong military-training component, 
[1, 9–21] for the protection of the state from outside danger (830c ff.). There will be mili-
tary drills — daily if possible — and monthly exercises in the various aspects of warfare, in 
which citizens will compete with one another in simulations of combat, “with real fighting 
with gloves and missiles closely modelled on the genuine articles” (830e). The weapons, he 
continues, “should be comparatively dangerous, in order that the sport may not be wholly 
without its perils, but give occasion for alarms, and thus serve, in its way, to discriminate 
a man of courage from a coward” (ibid.). If a life is occasionally lost in these exercises, the 
homicide will be regarded as involuntary (831a). The legislator’s view, he says, “will be that 
if a few men die, others as good will be born to take their place” (ibid.) — and this, he adds, 
is a far better situation than if we allow fear to die (ibid.).
These views carry over into his view of athletics in general. Boys’ and men’s running 
events (though not the women’s and girls’ events) will now take place with the competitors 
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in full armor (833a). Sports such as wrestling will be done away with, and in their place 
there will be single combats, or combats between pairs, again in full armor (833d6–e1). 
The boxing element in the pancration (a type of no-holds-barred wrestling, resulting on 
occasion in death) will also be eliminated, and a contest involving bows and arrows and 
slings put in its place. In sum: athletic contests, he says, which do not provide a training 
for war “should be bidden farewell” (832e2).
A fair inference from all this, we think, is that in Magnesia it will be young men who 
are trained specifically for combat, though young women will be engage in vigorous ex-
ercise. As far as the rest of their education is concerned, however, it will be the same for 
both groups. But how will this work out in the political arena? Plato has already said how 
foolish a society is which does not use the talent which lies in the one half of its population 
which is female. How does Magnesia plan to use that half, now that we know they are just 
as well educated as the other half?
Its commitment to education for all females as well as males would appear to be 
enough to ensure that there would be a plentiful supply of females as well as males for 
potential election to all the various offices of state. But in practice, women in Magnesia 
will be eligible to ‘enter office’ (archas) only at age forty (785b), i. e., when their child-
bearing duties are over, (men, by contrast, can first compete for office at the age of thirty, 
ibid.), and the offices in question do not appear to include any of the major offices of the 
state. The Minister of Education, for example, a post which Plato describes as ‘the most 
important of the highest offices of the state’ (765e), is by statute a ‘father of a family’. The 
Guardians of the Laws Plato refers to unequivocally as ‘men’ (andrasi, 755b5; ‘aner’ is 
the standard Greek word for ‘[adult] male’). The all-important Auditors of those finish-
ing their term of office are all ‘men’ (andras, 946a1). And the members of the Nocturnal 
Council are clearly men too, being comprised of ten Guardians of the Laws (all male), a 
Minister and an unspecified number of ex-Ministers of Education (all male), an unspeci-
fied number of (male) priests of distinction, and a number of junior members, who, being 
by statute aged between 30 and 40, are also clearly each one of them men, women being 
forbidden access to office before the age of forty. Note that at Meno (81a10) Plato clearly 
distinguishes priests and priestesses; the word ‘priest’ is not a generic term covering both. 
See also Laws (800b1, 828b4, 909d9), Phdr. (244b1), Rep. (461a7). As far as Magnesia is 
concerned, priests and priestesses are chosen by lot (759c), must be over sixty years of age, 
and hold office for one year.
The only other major public office left to which citizens are elected is the Advisory 
Council. We cannot be certain whether Plato intended women to form part of it, but the 
fact that those who, in final conjunction with a use of the lot-system, elect its members 
are once again ‘men’ (andra, 756e4) offers little reason for thinking it likely. If we add to 
this the fact that only males in Magnesia are entitled to hold property, and that women 
continue to have their marriages arranged by male relatives, [2, 388] it looks highly un-
likely that, by contrast with contemporary Athens, females have been granted citizenship 
(814c4)  in Magnesia, as some understand Plato to be saying. But we see that in distin-
guishing ‘politides’ and ‘citizens’ Plato is distinguishing between ‘free females dwelling in 
the polis’ and ‘citizens’ — who are free, male, and have all the rights of full citizenship. See 
Soph. Electr. 1227, Eurip. Electr. 1335, where no one would ever infer from the use of the 
word politides that the women in question enjoy the privileges of citizenship, even if, out 
of camaraderie, they address one another warmly as ‘politides’.
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If there is any political break-through for women in the second-best society, it is at a 
level well below that enjoyed by male citizens. While it is possible that the several referenc-
es to ‘andres’ are just slips on Plato’s part, this seems very unlikely, given the various other 
instances of high office where males and only males seem to be involved. A more likely 
explanation, it seems to me, is that women’s ‘entering office’ (785b5) simply means their 
‘entering public service,’ without specification of what the range of such service might be. 
An example of it would be membership, if elected, of the board of ‘female overseers’ of 
Magnesia’s marriages, something mentioned in the immediately antecedent paragraph, 
at 784a1-2. But this does not compare with the major offices open exclusively — appar-
ently — to men.
Why this apparent disconnect in the Laws between equal education for women and 
equal access to political office for women? We can begin by going back to the Guardians 
of the Republic, where, after an education equal to that which male prospects for Guardi-
anship undergo, female Guardians — by a natural progression — rule Kallipolis on an 
absolutely equal footing with male Guardians. So why does Plato not follow this same 
progression in Magnesia?
The first thing to notice is that Plato seems to have come to believe over time that, 
were his perfect society ever to come into being, it would have as a number of its inhabit-
ants people who are ‘in a way, gods and children of gods’ (the philosopher-rulers, presum-
ably) (739d). But such godlike creatures are the product of rigorous genetic selection and 
a second-order education denied to all others. In the Laws, by contrast, where there is one 
education for all, and no genetic selection of anyone for anything, all who achieve power 
will do so by a standard political process of elections and the lot-system. And in this more 
recognizable world women — educated or not — will have a role to play which makes 
them unfit for all political office other than, as we saw (see n. 6), the one involving supervi-
sion of marriages, and even here, where they are unable to adjudicate a particular problem 
they encounter, they must defer to the final decision of a group of ten (male) Guardians 
of the Laws (784bc).
This could of course be put down to the standard belief that a woman’s place is in 
the home, and that the chief objective of even an education identical to what all the men 
have received will still be primarily the production of citizen-children. But Plato’s earlier 
comment on a good society’s using all the talent available to it, including that of the fifty 
percent of that society who are women, suggests that Plato had in mind something more 
broad-ranging than that. For example, his introduction of public eating tables for women, 
Spartan-style, to go with the public eating-tables for men, suggests that he wants at least 
a social (if not a political) life for women in Magnesia that is far broader than anything 
hitherto tried in his own city of Athens. 
Even here, however, the move seems to have nothing to do with what would seem 
on the face of it a reasonable possibility, and that it is women’s equal education to men 
which has now empowered them to a social life — if only one of eating with one another 
in public — equal to that enjoyed by men. Unfortunately, Plato himself suggests a reason 
much less agreeable, and much more in line with contemporary beliefs about women. The 
reason , he says, is one of security. Just as common tables for men served as a security de-
vice in controlled societies like Crete and Sparta (780c), so too common tables for women 
as well as men will serve as a security device in his own society, Magnesia. As he puts it 
with distressing bluntness: “The very half of the race which is generally predisposed by its 
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weakness to undue secrecy and craft — the female sex — has been left to its disorders by 
the mistaken concession of the legislator [in societies such as Athens]… Women — left 
without any chastening restraint — is not, as you might fancy, merely half the problem; 
nay, she is a twofold and more than a twofold problem, as her native disposition is inferior 
to a man’s.” He goes on to talk about how women need to be forced out of the shady cor-
ners in which they like to hide “into the daylight” (781c), where they can be kept under 
observation.
This is very uncomfortable reading. It does not suggest, of course, that Plato’s views 
on women are worse than those of any other Greek of the day; but it does not suggest that 
they are any better either. And to be sure we fully understand them, we need to spend a 
moment looking at the precise import for him of the word ‘inferior’. A hint of it comes 
in the Republic (469d7), when he talks of the ‘womanish, petty minds’ of those who wait 
till the battle is over and then rush onto the battle field to rob the dead of their armour 
and accoutrements. The clear suggestion is that women have a tendency towards coward-
ice (perhaps unsurprisingly, the word on Greek for ‘brave’ is ‘manly’, andreios), and this 
is re-reinforced by a strong passage in the Timaeus (90e ff.), where he talks about how 
reincarnation in a woman’s body is the punishment for a man who in a previous life was 
characterized by ‘cowardice and injustice’ (90e7).
One might perhaps object that the passage we have just quoted, suggesting so strong-
ly as it does that Plato considers women to be characterized by moral fault, particularly but 
not exclusively cowardice, and hence appropriate punishment-receptacles for males who 
have shown moral faults, is ‘only a myth’. But unfortunately this argument will not work, 
since later on, in the Laws (944d), in a context of open discussion, where no-one would 
ever claim that myth is involved, Plato has the following to say:
“Now what shall we call a fitting punishment for the coward who throws away [his] 
weapons…? A human judge cannot, indeed, invert the transformation which is said to 
have been wrought on Caeneus of Thessaly; he, we are told, had been a woman, but a god 
changed him into a man. Were the reverse process, transformation from man to woman, 
that, in a way, would be of all penalties the properest for the man who has flung his shield 
away”.
Thus a woman is a converted man, fashioned as a result of a gender reassignment 
operation, which took place at the beginning of time. If so, women can be educated in the 
same way as men. No wonder Plato also argues in the Timaeus that women of the Guard-
ian class should be educated by the same techniques as those used for men. “Moreover, we 
went on to say about women that their natures must be attuned into accord with the men, 
and that the occupations assigned to them, both in war and in all other activities of life, 
should in every case be the same for all alike” (Timaeus 18c; tr. W. R. M. Lamb).
So, some women are inherently masculine. It is especially pronounced in the best 
of them  — those who, according to the verdict of the sages of Kallipolis, are included 
among the Guardians. However, Plato goes further, revealing the presence in some men, 
too, of a kind of femininity. The clearest instance of his thinking on this subject we see 
in the Statesman, in the passage dealing with citizens of ‘good character’ who differ from 
others not by their fervent courage, but by their modesty (cosmiotetos). When citizens of 
this sort constitute a majority in the polis, the following process takes place: “Those who 
are especially decorous are ready to live always a quiet and retired life and to mind their 
own business; this is the manner of their intercourse with everyone at home, and they 
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are equally ready at all times to keep peace in some way or other with foreign states. And 
because of this desire of theirs, which is often inopportune and excessive, when they have 
their own way they quite unconsciously become unwarlike, and they make the young men 
unwarlike also; they are at the mercy of aggressors; and thus in a few years they and their 
children and the whole state often pass by imperceptible degrees from freedom to slavery” 
(Statesman 307e–308a, tr. H. N. Fowler). Recall that the stranger from Elea, the leading 
character of the dialogue, offers to weave the web of state with a basis of hard masculine 
natures as its warp, and with lush and modest natures as its woof. Modest natures here play 
the role of the feminine, ‘manly’ natures the role of the masculine.
Thus, in Plato’s picture of “gender” reality, the separation of male and female from 
each other was not as fundamental as it is often made out to be. Woman has her origin in 
man, but femininity may also be represented in the ‘masculine’ areas of the polity.
In his views on gender, Plato was less committed to a fundamental opposition be-
tween masculine and feminine than was Aristotle in the Politics, and in this he is far more 
archaic. His ideas about the origin of the feminine principle in the “oversoul” (male soul 
that existed before the first female soul), and about concealing the presence of male and fe-
male principles in the political habitus of the city, are close to the gender realities which we 
often see in antiquity. Male Athenians at the time of Dionysius often represented female 
characters from mythology. So Apollonius of Tyana “heard them dancing lascivious jigs 
to the rondos of a pipe, and in the midst of the sacred epic of Orpheus striking attitudes as 
the Hours, or as nymphs, or as bacchants” (Flav. Philostr. Vita Apollonii, IV. 21, transl. by 
F. C. Conybeare). By contrast, Spartan brides dress up and cut their hair men’s style: “After 
the woman was thus carried off, the bridesmaid, so called, took her in charge, cut her hair 
off close to the head, put a man’s cloak and sandals on her, and laid her down on a pal-
let, on the floor, alone, in the dark” (Plut. Lycurg. 15.3, transl. by B. Perrin, 1914). But the 
anthropogenic proximity of masculine and feminine principles does not mean an absence 
of differences between them. This fact is especially important, according to Plato, in the 
context of the political reality of the “century of Zeus».
With that, we are now finally in a position to make our argument. The reason, it seems 
to us, why Plato is unwilling, in the Laws, to make a causal connexion between equality in 
education and equality in access to public office is because, in a real world rather than a 
paradigmatic world, a world where rulers will be of recognizable, flesh and blood human 
beings, not ‘in way, gods and children of gods’, women have a tendency to moral fault — 
like cowardice and, more broadly, ‘injustice’ — such that they cannot be trusted with such 
power. It is a conclusion which cannot help but distress, but it seems to us the one which 
makes the most sense of the evidence available.
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